Professoren
Prof. Volker Nocke

Prof. Volker Nocke

Journal Publications

An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment (with Stephen Yeaple). Review of Economic Studies, 2008, vol. 57(2), 529-557.

Platform Ownership (with Martin Peitz and Konrad Stahl). Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, vol. 5(6), 1130-1160.

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? (with Lucy White), American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97(4), 1321-1339.

A Theory of Clearance Sales (with Martin Peitz). Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 117(522), 964-990.

Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions versus Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity (with Stephen Yeaple). Journal of International Economics, 2007, vol. 72(2), 336-365.

Collusion and Dynamic (Under-)Investment in Quality. RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, vol. 38(1), 227-249.

A Gap for Me: Entrepreneurs and Entry. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2006, vol. 4(5), 929-956.

Firm Turnover in Imperfectly Competitive Markets (with Marcus Asplund). Review of Economic Studies, 2006, vol. 73(2), 295-327. Lead Article.

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (with George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2004, vol. 13(4), 617-633.

Hyperbolic Discounting and Secondary Markets (with Martin Peitz). Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44(1), 77-97.


Working Papers

Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints (with John Thanassoulis). CEPR Discussion Paper DP7636, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

Dynamic Merger Review (with Michael D. Whinston). NBER Working Paper w14526, National Bureau of Economic Research. Revise & resubmit at Journal of Political Economy.

Globalization and the Size Distribution of Multiproduct Firms (with Stephen Yeaple). CEPR Discussion Paper DP6948, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

Competition for Scarce Resources (with Peter Eso and Lucy White). CSIO Working Paper #0092, Northwestern University. Revise & resubmit at RAND Journal of Economics.

Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device (with Martin Peitz). CEPR Discussion Paper DP6664, Centre for Economic Policy Research. Revise & resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory.

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games (with George J. Mailath and Lucy White). CEPR Discussion Paper DP4793, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

Monopolisation and Industry Structure. Economics Working Paper 2000-W27, Nuffield College, Oxford.

Cartel Stability under Capacity Constraints: The Traditional View Restored. STICERD Discussion Paper EI/23, London School of Economics.


Work in Progress

Merger Policy with Merger Choice (with Michael D. Whinston).

Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyer (with Lucy White).

International Merger Policy (with Michael D. Whinston).

Dynamic Bargaining with Externalities (with Mark Satterthwaite and Michael D. Whinston).


Research Talks (since 2009)

2010

DIW Berlin, ESMT Berlin, Luxembourg, Workshop on Market Power in Vertically Related Markets (Berlin), Alicante [scheduled], Sciences-Po Paris [scheduled], Munich [scheduled]

2009

Journees Doctorales de l'ADRES (CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain) [Keynote Lecture], KU Leuven, EIEF Workshop on Structural Approaches to Productivity and Industrial Dynamics (Rome), CEPR Applied Industrial Organization Conference (Mannheim), Oxford, Pompeu Fabra (2x), CRESSE Conference on Competition and Regulation (Chania, Crete), Köln, EARIE Annual Conference (Ljubljana), Minnesota, Wisconsin (Madison), Texas (Austin), Northwestern, Columbia, Michigan

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