Professoren
Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Till Requate

Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Till Requate

1990 Dissertation-Award of "Lippisch-Westf\"alischen University Society.

January 1991 "von-Bennigsen-Foerder-Award" 50.000 DM for Young Resarchers.Papers in Refereed Journals:

“A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers”, in: Environmental and Development Economics, forthcoming (2009)
(with Anke Reichhuber and Eva Camacho).

“The Dynamics of Optimal Abatement Strategies for Interacting Pollutants - An Illustration in the Greenhouse,” in: Ecological Economics 86 (2009), 1521-534
(with Ulf Moslener).

“Environmental Policy and Uncertain Arrival of Future Abatement Technology”, in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8 (2008)/Issue 1/Topics (with Andreas
von Döllen).

“Optimal Abatement in Dynamic Multi-Pollutant Problems when Pollutants are Complements or Substitutes”, in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31
(2007), 2293-2316 (with Ulf Moslener).

“Pollution-Reducing and Resource-Saving Technological Progress,” in: International Journal of Agricultural, Resources, Governance and Ecology 6 (1) (2007), 5-44
(with Dagmar Nelissen).

“Dynamic Incentives by Environmental Policy Instruments - a Survey,” in: Ecological Economics 54 (2005), 175-195.

“The Dixit-Pindyck and the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry Option Values are not Equivalent. A note on Fisher (2000),” in: Resource and Energy Economics 27
(2005), 83-88. (with Paul Mensink).

“Commitment and Timing of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology, and Repercussions on R&D,” in: Environmental and Resource Economics 31 (2005), 175-199.

"Der steinige Weg von der Theorie in die Praxis des Emissionshandels: Die EURichtlinie zum CO2-Emissionshandel und ihre nationale Umsetzung,“ in:
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 6 (1) [2005], 41-56 (with Patrick Graichen).

“Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution,” in: Environmental and Resource Economics, 29, [2004] 231-252 (with
Francisco Alpizar, and Albert Schramm).

“Vertical Contracts and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47 [2004], 260-269 (with Steve Hamilton).

"Emission Taxes and the Design of Refunding Schemes," forthcoming in: Journal of Public Economics, 88 [2004], 713-725 (with Hans Gersbach).

"Environmental Policy Incentives to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology - Will the True Ranking Please Stand up?" forthcoming in: European Economic Review [2003] (with Wolfram Unold).

"Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollutions Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking", Environmental and Resource Economics 22 [2002], 369-390 (with Dan Phaneuf).

"On the Incentives by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157 No. 4 [2001], 536-554 (with Wolfram Unold).

"Pollution Control by Options Trading" in: Economics Letters [2001], 73, 253-258 (with Wolfram Unold).

"How to win the Political Contest: A Monopolist vs. Environmentalists" in: Public Choice 108 [2001], 273-293 (with Patrick Graichen and Bouwe Dijkstra).

"Pigouvian Taxes May Fail Even in a Perfect World" in: Public Finance Vol.52 (3-4) 1997 [published in 2000], 449-455.

"Financial Markets for Unknown Risks if Beliefs Differ" in: Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance Theory, 25 [2000], 29-49 (with Susanne Klimpel).

"Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution Rule", Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2 [2000], 25-42 (with Andreas Lange).

"Die Wertschätzung von Umweltqualität aus neoklassischer Sicht" in: Umweltpsychologie, 3 [1999], 50-67.

"Incentives to Innovate under Pollution Taxes and Tradeable Permits", European Journal of Political Economy, 14 [1998], 139-165.

"Green Taxes in Oligopoly if the Number of Firms is Endogenous", Finanzarchiv, 54 [1997], 261-280.

"Population Size and Environmental Quality", Journal of Population Economics, 10 [1997], 299-316 (with Marc Cronshaw).

"Incentives to Adopt New Technologies under Different Pollution Control Policies", International Tax and Public Finance, 2 [1995], 293-315.

"Repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs", International Journal of Game Theory, 23 [1994], 1-24.

"Pollution Control under Imperfect Competition via Taxes or Permits: Cournot Duopoly", Journal of Economics, 58 [1993], 255-291.

"Equivalence of Effluent Taxes and Permits for Environmental Regulation of Several Local Monopolies", Economics Letters, 42 [1993], 91-95.

"Pollution Control under Imperfect Competition: Asymmetric Bertrand Duopoly with Linear Technologies", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 [1993], 415-442.

"Once again Pure Exchange Economies: A Critical View towards the Structuralistic Reconstructions by Balzer and Stegmüller", Erkenntnis, 34 [1991], 87-116.


Book Chapters and Miscellaneous:

„Umweltpolitische Instrumente in Theorie und Praxis“, in Politische Bildung 2008/2, 75-96 (with Johanna Reichenbach).

„Deutschlands Beitrag zur Lösung des Weltklimaproblems: Was lässt sich erreichen?“ in: ifo Schnelldienst 7 [2007], 3-18 (mit Sigmar Gabriel, Alfred Endres, Lutz Wicke und Rüdiger Pethig), darin: „Zweimal mal 20% - Ist Europa beim Klimaschutz auf dem richtigen Weg?“

„Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition,“ in: Folmer, H. and T. Tietenberg: The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2006/2007, pp. 120-208, Edward Elgar [2006].

"Dynamische Anreize Umweltpolitischer Instrumente – Ein Überblick," in W. Franz, et al. (Hrsg.) Umwelt und Energie, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren 35 [2006], Mohr Siebeck Tübingen.

"Zum Zusammenhang von Effizienz und Nachhaltigkeit", in: W. Franz, et al. (Hrsg.) Wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderungen an der Jahrhundertwende,
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren 30 [2001], Mohr Siebeck Tübingen.

"Emission Taxes For Price Setting Firms: Differentiated Commodities and Monopolistic Competition,“ in: Petrakis, E., Sartzetakis, E. a nd A. Xepapadeas (Hrsg.): Environmental Regulation and Market Structure, Edward Elgar [1999] (with Andreas Lange).

"Atomausstieg auf dem Markt“, in Frankfurter Randschau, Rubrik: Umwelt und Wissenschaft, 12.Oktober 1999, Nr. 237 (with Patrick Graichen).

"Prinzipal-Agent-Modelle," in: Geigant et al. (Hrsg.): Lexikon der Volkswirtschaft, 6. Aufl. [1994], Landsberg/Lech: Verl. Moderne Industrie.

"Permits or Taxes? How to Regulate Cournot Duopoly with Polluting Firms," in: L. Preisner (Hrsg.): Institutions and Environmental Protection - Conference Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Meeting of the EAERE, Vol. 2. [1993], Krakau.

"Comments on `Monitoring the Emissions of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method'," in: R. Pethig (Hrsg.): Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing
Environmental Resources, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, Springer-Verlag [1991].


Submitted Papers, Working Papers and Work in Progress:

“Alternative Use Systems for the Remaining Cloud Forest in Ethiopia and the Role of Arabica Coffee - A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” (with Anke Reichhuber), revise and
resubmit at World Development.

“Subsidies for Wind Power: Surfing down the Learning Curve?” Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2007, (with A. Blaesi), revise and resubmit at Public Finance and
the Environment.

“An Experimental Study on the Regulation of Non-Point Source Pollution and the Role of Risk Attitude,” Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2007, (with E. Camacho),
under consideration

“Fairness in an Intergenerational Dictator Game With Social Interaction, an Experimental Study, Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2008, (with Gunter Bahr), under consideration

“Learning-by-Doing with Spillovers in Competitive Industries, Market Entry, and Regulatory Policy”, Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2007, (with A. Blaesi)

“Environmental Policy and Uncertain Arrival of Future Abatement Technology,” Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2007, (with A. von Doellen)

“Get more independent! Input and Output-Market-Based Dynamic Incentives to Adopt Input-Saving Technology” Kiel Economics Working Paper, 2007, (with A. von Doellen)

Nutzungshinweise: Jede natürliche Person darf sich nur mit einer E-Mail Adresse bei WiWi-Online registrieren lassen. Die Nutzung der Daten die WiWi-Online bereitstellt ist nur für den privaten Gebrauch bestimmt - eine gewerbliche Nutzung ist verboten. Eine automatisierte Nutzung von WiWi-Online und dessen Inhalte, z.B. durch Offline-Browser, Download-Manager oder Webseiten etc. ist ausdrücklich strengstens untersagt. Zuwiderhandlungen werden straf- und zivilrechtlich verfolgt.